Hunters-ROTC Memo Disseminating Instructions from the US Army's GHQ-SWPA Jan 1945

25 January 1945

1. The American Army in the north is advancing faster than expected due to surprising weak resistance of the Japanese Army in the North. At present, most of the troops in Batangas and Tayabas are rushing to the North as fast as their scanty transportation facilities will permit. It is believed that the Japanese have now given up expectations of landings in Batangas and are now rushing the troops there to the Central Plains to join up with the main forces in there.

2. This state of affairs gives General Dunkel now sufficient reason for landings in Southern Luzon with his troops in Mindoro which are less than a division reinforced by a regiment of paratroops. It should be remembered that Dunkel landed in Marinduque without orders and he was not blamed for it because he was successful. The old man is itching to make a name for himself by landing in Batangas. And he may do it anytime.

3. This calls for preparations on our part. MOBILIZE THE UNITS and have them in readiness all the time. They should be ready to be massed at certain places any time. TIME NOW SHOULD BE SPENT TO MAKING TRAINING AND TRAINING THE MEN. There is a lot of hard job for all of us. Harden now your men that they may not be crying babies later on which is only shameful. DISCIPLINE THEM. TEACH THEM TO OBEY. TEACH THEM TO BE UNCOMPLAINING. Teach them Combat Principles, MARKSMANSHIP, and SCOUTING AND PATROLLING. Acquaint them with apparent battlegrounds. Acquaint them with all the trails.

4. URGENT: Re HORSES. This Headquarters will need plenty of horses anytime in the immediate future. All friendly units have already been SOS’ed for this matter. These horses will be used for the common good. COMMANDEER ALL AVAILABLE PACK HORSES AND BASKETS WITHIN YOUR VICINITY AND TAKE THEM TO GHQ HUNTERS before the 30^th [of] January 1945. Those who refuse to cooperate shall be treated as NOT COOPERATING. No questions asked now. This [is] the army in need. TAKE ALL HORSES HERE.

5. URGENT: Re GUIDES. Time and I again, I had emphasized to all Commanders to SEND GUIDES TO GHQ HUNTERS aside from maintaining a pool of their own guides in their respective Headquarters. Due to [the] failure to realize the seriousness of the situation and the tremendous responsibility that lies on our shoulders, ALL COMMANDERS OF THE 47 DIVISIONS HAVE NOT yet complied with instructions. It will indeed be very embarrassing on our part here, and the whole damned organization for that matter, IF ALL OF A SUDDEN ONE NIGHT THEY LAND HERE AND FIND NO GUIDES READY — THE GUIDES WE KEPT SQUEAKING TO THEM BY RADIO AS ALREADY READY. I hold all Commanders responsible IF NO GUIDES APPEAR AT THIS HEADQUARTERS BEFORE THE 30^th OF JANUARY. These guides have to be trained yet. They are not yet militarily intelligent enough to be of some use to troops. THEY’VE GOT TO BE TRAINED FIRST. It is embarrassing for us if we will be providing DUMB GUIDES to future reconnaissance officers and patrol officers. So, I shall demand THAT TEN MEN FROM ALFONSO, BAILEN, MAGALLANES REPORT HERE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS ON THE 30^th of January. They should be ready to guide troops to CARILLAO, TALAMITAN, KAYLAWAY, KAYTINGA, etc. From the 1^st Battalion of the 49^th INFANTRY, I demand five guides to stay at this Headquarters WHO CAN LEAD TROOPS TO BATULAO, PALICO, TUY, CALATAGAN, AGA, TUMALIM, ETC. ALL OF THESE GUIDES SHOULD BE HERE ON THE 30^TH OF JANUARY.

6. Re – MESSAGES: Copies of standing orders to the different loyal guerrilla units are always sent to them. I AM DEPENDING ON THE 47^th DIVISION TROOPS to deliver these urgent messages to those loyal guerrillas. The 47^th DIVISION, with its tentacles extending everywhere and contacting all guerrilla organizations will serve well as a medium for the delivery of urgent and important messages to those other units. This Headquarters now is not only the GHQ of the Hunters but now is also acting as coordination station. I DEPEND ON THE HUNTERS ON THE PROPER HANDLING OF COMMUNICATIONS. Communications to any unit should promptly be delivered. In case of failure, [a] proper report should be made. Some guerrilla units from Batangas complain that they have not received any communication from us when I told them that they were being furnished copies of all orders through our own men. It is either that these messages have been allowed to pile in a CP file, neglected, or they have been handed over to the wrong persons. ALL

7. CARRY ON WITH THE PREPARATIONS. Carry on WITH GREATER VIGOR [the next words are to blurred to be read] FACILITIES. AFTER THE [unreadable] FOR THEIR DOCUMENTS. CAPTURE ALIVE STAFF OFFICERS AND SEND THEM HERE. DO NOT ENGAGE LARGE PATROLS YET. STRIKE STRIKE STRIKE WE WANT TO RECEIVE MORE REPORTS OF [unreadable] FOR TRANSMITTAL. STRIKE, DESTROY ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS, DESTROY HIS CARTS, TRUCKS, etc. DESTROY [unreadable line of words] WHERE NO SUCH CIVILIANS ARE PRESENT. [The rest of the paragraph is unreadable.]

8. [This entire paragraph is unreadable.]

9. These instructions should be carried down to the lowest echelons.

(SGD.) TERRY MAGTANGOL
Colonel, Infantry
C.O. Hunters