The Alcazar Battalion was a guerrilla unit purportedly founded by one Emilio Alcazar in the town of Talisay, Batangas in March of 1942. It was supposedly initially affiliated with Marcos Agustin’s guerrilla outfit but, because of difficulties in communicating with the mother unit, it later became attached instead to the Hunters-ROTC. Communication with this other large organization, however, was also poor so that essentially, the Alcazar Battalion operated independently. In this page is a transcription1 of the investigative report on the Alcazar Battalion filed by one Lt. Rollie E. Allen of the United States Army..
C O N F I D E N T I A L
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC
G-3 Guerrilla Affairs Branch
19 June ’46
REPORT ON “ALCAZAR’S BATTALION”
In accordance with verbal instructions from the Chief of Section, Guerrilla Affairs, G-3, AFWESPAC, Lieutenant Rollie E. Allen proceeded to Talisay to contact the “Alcazar Battalion,” in order to determine whether or not this organization should be recognized by the United States Army. The following report is a summary of the investigation and the basis for the recommendation.
H I S T O R Y
Alcazar’s Battalion is a guerrilla organization founded by Emilio Alcazar in March 1942. The unit had its headquarters in Talisay and operated within a ten mile radius of that town. Shortly after their organization was founded, a liaison officer, Dionisio Medrana, of Marking’s forces inducted the unit into Marking’s Guerrillas. But communication was poor and no word was ever sent from Marking. So, in August 1944, the unit joined the R.O.T.C. Hunters and became the 4th Bn of the 49th Regt.
The Alcazar Battalion is composed of four infantry companies, A, B, C & D, Headquarters Company and Bn Headquarters.
The commanding officer was betrayed by another guerrilla and was arrested by the Japanese. He was held for two months and released. But during this time, the organization had broken up and remained inactive from August 1942 until it was again revived by Emilio Alcazar in November 1942.
The unit did not have contact with the Hunters men so it acted as an independent unit rather than a subordinate. Their main activities were to watch Japanese movements and look for Japanese fortifications. On three occasions, men from this battalion cut communication lines.
The unit was poorly armed and was not able to carry on combat with the Japanese. When the Americans landed, two members of this organization served with them as scouts and interpreters. Outside of these two men, very few of Alcazar’s men saw action in the liberation campaigns. The unit dissolved permanently in March 1945.
F I N D I N G S
The following persons were interviewed by the contact team and their statements are the basis for the findings:
1. Remegio Casalne - Mayor of Talisay
2. Juan Ortilla - Chief of Police
3. Florencio Luna - M/Sgt. of said unit
4. Vicente Baldoz - T/Sgt. of said unit
5. Pablo Ortillo - Capt., CO Hdq Co
6. Emilio A. Alcazar - Lt. Col., Com. Off. of said unit
7. Octavio Nicolas - Capt., CO A Co
8. Rufo Carandang - Corporal, Bn Staff
9. Gregorio Solis - S/Sgt of said unit
10. Bernabe Luna - Pfc of said unit
11. Leopoldo Ortilla - Sgt. sanitary inspector of Co C
12. Pio Mercado - 1st Lt
13. Barba A. Marayag - 1st Lt
14. Roman M. Umali - 1st Lt, worked for Japanese during occup.
15. Juan Villanueva - 2d Lt., supply officer
16. Fernando T. Atienza - 1st Lt., intelligence officer
17. Julio Abello - 2d Lt., platoon leader
18. Octavio Nicolas - Capt., S-1 and CO Hdq Co
19. Conrado Atienza y Trinidad - 2d Lt., Co Commdr.
20. Terry Adevoso - Col., CO Hunters
21. Jose S. Marasigan - Capt., Co Commdr.
22. Vicente Sangalang Marasigan - 1st Lt., Ex Off, Co A
Upon investigation of Alcazar’s Battalion, or 4th Bn, 49th Regt, Hunters ROTC, it was found that the leaders did not have adequate control or contact with members of the unit. Officers and enlisted men interviewed stated that they only met two or three times a month and at these meetings, there was never more than 50 men. The unit did not have a camp or headquarters from which to direct operations.
Another instance which indicated lack of control was that one field grade officer and five enlisted men joined Ambat’s Guerrillas and were recognized with this unit. Col. Alcazar was at a loss to explain the reason for their leaving his unit.
The unit was attached to Marking’s Guerrillas for a while and then to ROTC Hunters. But due to their inactivity and non-communication, they were dropped from the rosters of both units. Col. Terry Adevoso, CO of ROTC Hunters, said that he had never heard of the Alcazar Bn and, furthermore, that the 49th Regt had only two battalions and, therfore, there could not have been a 4th Bn. The unit commander himself stated that they never did operate with any other guerrilla forces in any kind of operations.
One of the men in the organization was employed by the Japanese government and claimed to have been an intelligence agent. However, the commanding officer did not know he was employed by the Japanese. It is obvious that if the unit had a member working among the Japanese, the commanding officer would have some knowledge of it.
For 800 officers and men, there were only five rifles and arms. The unit never at any time engaged in combat activities as a unit against the Japanese. Several men were with an American when two Japanese were killed, and this is their only claim to actual combat
against the Japanese. The men without arms were supposed to have been intelligence operators and to have committed sabotage against the Japanese. These acts of sabotage were limited to the three times communication lines were cut. As far as intelligence reports are concerned, it is obvious that they were useless as they had no way to transmit or deliver the messages to an outside source. Their intelligence work was a result of spying on Japanese troops movements and Japanese fortifications.
The unit never had any trouble with supplying the men with food because all of them lived at home on farms and grew their own food. All the men interviewed stated that they lived at home in order to support their families and had contact with the unit several times a month. Money was donated by several of the wealthier men in the area and, in exchange, they were included in the roster. It was stated by these men that they never left their homes or participated in activities against the Japanese.
It is believed that this whole unit was a weak home guard organization in that their activities were limited to almost nothing. And the fact that all the men lived at home supports this claim.
The unit commander, Alcazar, had no original or valuabe documents to present as evidence. He claims that all the records were burned in order to keep the Japanese from getting them. Other papers presented were worthless or of little value.
This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.
After careful consideration of the statements made by the present members and an analysis of the documents presented, it is recommended that the “Alcazar Battalion” be not favorably considered for recognition.
[Sgd.] ROLLIE E. ALLEN
Notes and references:
2d Lt., Inf., 0-1339745
Contact Team No. 1
“The Alcazar Battalion,” online at the United States National Archives.