History of the Lobo Unit USAFFE Guerrillas Commanded by Jacinto Maranan
[TRANSCRIPTION]
USAFFE (GUERRILLA)
LOBO UNIT-MINDE AREA
ATTACHED TO THE PANDITA AREA
SECOND BATTALION
IN THE FIELD
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“CONTINUATION”
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“CONTINUATION”
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CONTINUATION
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“CONTINUATION”
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“CONTINUATION”
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Notes and references:
1 “Pandita Area, Free Luzon Intelligence Echelon, 6th MD, [Folder 4],” online at the United States National Archives.
The Lobo Unit, USAFFE Guerrilla was originally considered by the United States army as part of the Pandita Area, DI Combat, Free Luzon Area, 6th Military District guerrilla outfit under the command of one Danny Flores. The mother organization was not favorably considered for recognition by the United States Army. In this page is a transcription1 of a document outlining the alleged foundation and subsequent activities of the Lobo Unit as commanded by one Major Jacinto B. Maranan.
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LOBO UNIT-MINDE AREA
ATTACHED TO THE PANDITA AREA
SECOND BATTALION
IN THE FIELD
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FOUNDATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR JACINTO B. MARANAN
DECEMBER 8, 1941, THE MOST HISTORICAL DATE IN THE HISTORY OF THE ORIENT FROM MEDIEVAL TO MODERN AGES IN THE ANNALS OF HUMAN WARFARE AND STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGN POWER HAD REACHED AND OVERSHADOWED THE PHILIPPINES, THE PEARL OF THE ORIENT SEAS. ON THIS MEMORABLE DATE, THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE FAR EAST MADE A VIGOROUS ENCOUNTER AGAINST THE INVADERS TO DEFEND THE SACRED SHORES TRAMPED BY THESE BARBARIC AGGRESSORS.
FROM NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, WE COULD TRACE THE HEROIC BLOOD OF OUR VALIANT SOLDIERS THAT FLOODED UP TO BATAAN. FOR MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS OF UNBELIEVABLE CHALLENGES THAT NO WORDS COULD EVER DESCRIBE IT, CAME AT LAST TO THE MOST FATAL ENDING ON APRIL 9, 1942, “THE FALL OF BATAAN” WITH THE LAST HOPE OF CORREGIDOR WHICH WAS THE LAST STRONGHOLD OF OURS, THERE OUR MEN OF STEEL DEFENDED IT WITH THEIR BEST ABILITIES AND CAPACITIES, BUT BY THE MIDDLE OF MAY 1942, THE WHOLE WORLD WAS SHAKEN BY THE FALL OF CORREGIDOR ON MAY 8, 1942.
NOW COMES THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION WHOSE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES WERE NOT FITTED NOR SATISFACTORY TO THE TASTE AND FEELINGS OF THE FILIPINOS. THE JAPANESE LOOKED TOWARD US AS AN INFERIOR ONES, NO, THEY TREATED US INHUMANELY WHENEVER WE COULD NOT ABIDE BY THEIR WILL AND WISHES. THE OPPRESSION OF THE FILIPINOS WERE IMMEASURABLE BY THIS BALD-HEADED PEOPLE OF THE MONKEY LANGUAGE. HOSTILITIES AROSE IN EVERY CORNER OF THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, IN THE MIDST OF THIS SITUATION, THE FILIPINOS STILL BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD FULFILL THEIR PROMISE OF RETURN. NOW CAME THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS AS A CHALLENGE TO THE JAPANESE THREAT BY PROTECTING AND GUIDING THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE NOT TO LOSE THEIR FAITH IN LIBERATION TO COME. MEN OF COURAGE WITH STRONG DETERMINATION AND WHOSE LOVE AND CARE FOR HIS COUNTRY AND PEOPLE DO NOT FATE NOR SHADOWED BY FEAR, ORGANIZED UNIT AFTER UNIT FOR THE CONTINUOUS RESISTANCE RATHER THAN BE BOUND BY THE JAPANESE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES. THE FLOOD OF ENDLESS STRUGGLE REACHED OUR PLACE. I, JACINTO B. MARANAN, A LOYAL CITIZEN OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT, THRU THE HELP OF CIRIACO L. SOLIS, A USAFFE MAN, FINALLY DECIDED TO JOIN THE MOVEMENTS, THUS BY OCTOBER 1, 1942, WE JOINTLY CAMPAIGNED FOR THE ENLISTMENT OF RECRUITS. IN MY RECRUITING, I MET SALUSTIANO B. MANALO, SEVERO A. ILAGAN, AND CELERINO S. AGUILA, WITH THE SAME MISSION. BY THE END OF OCTOBER, THESE LEADERS HAD A GROUP OF FOLLOWERS WHO WERE WILLING TO OBEY THEIR LEADERS AND HAD GROUPS OF FOLLOWERS WHO WERE WILLING TO OBEY THEIR LEADERS’ COMMANDS. IN SUCH A PLACE AS LOBO, FORMED THESE SMALL GROUPS THAT SHOULD WORK HARMONIOUSLY TO CARRY THE TASK FORWARD. NOW, I HAD LARGER GROUPS OF FOLLOWERS, I AS THE LEADER AND CIRIACO L. SOLIS WAS MY ASSISTANT.
HE ALSO HELPED ME IN CONTACTING SEVERAL LEADERS TO UNIT AND THRU OUR EFFORTS, WE HAD UNITED ALL GROUPS. I AS THE HEAD LEADER AND MY ASSISTANT WAS MY SECOND HEAD LEADER AND THE OTHERS WERE GROUP LEADERS. UPON THE UNITY OF THESE GROUPS, I NOW HAD A UNIT TO MOVE AS ONE BODY UNDER MY FULL COMMAND. I ORDERED MY GROUP LEADERS TO CONTINUE RECRUITING AND INSTRUCTING EVERY INDIVIDUAL MEMBER TO PLANT IN THEIR AIMS THE ORGANIZATION
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AND HOW IT WOULD BE CARRIED ON. INSTRUCTED MY GROUP LEADERS TO BE IN SECRET AND BE IN A LAY LOW CONDITION AND NOT TO MAKE ANY ANNOYANCES WHICH WOULD BE THE WICK TO THE DANGER TO CIVILIANS, TO SUPPRESS RIOTS AND BANDITRY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION. BY THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER, THE ENLISTMENT OF RECRUITS REACHED ITS FULL STRENGTH. UPON MY ORDERS, MY ASSISTANT CONFERRED WITH THE GROUP LEADERS TO STUDY THE PROBLEMS OF CARRYING THE TASK FORWARD IN THE MIDST OF A DANGEROUS SITUATION. I ORDERED ALL GROUP LEADERS TO REPORT TO MY HIDEOUTS TO DESIGNATE THEIR SECTORS TO BE PROTECTED BY THEIR MEN AND TO ASSUME THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES. MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY COURTESY WERE BEING INSTRUCTED AND BY THE SECOND TO THE LAST WEEK OF NOVEMBER 1942, I ORDERED MY MEN TO ASSIGN GUARDS IN THEIR SECTORS TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND TO NOTIFY CIVILIANS OF THE PROBABLE APPROACH OF THE JAPANESE SO THAT THEY WOULD ALWAYS BE READY FOR ANY EMERGENCY. HAVING HEARD OF THE ESPINA’S OUTFIT IN THE NEIGHBORING TOWN, I JOURNEYED TO BATANGAS WITH MY WIFE.
THE NEXT DAY, I MET COL. ESPINA AND, DURING OUR CONFERENCE, I AFFILIATED MY UNIT TO HIS UNIT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE HARMONIOUS MOVEMENT OF OUR MEN. BY THE NEXT DAY, WE RETURNED TO OUR HEADQUARTERS. I THEN ORDERED MY EXECUTIVE OFFICER TO DESIGNATE OUR MEN TO THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES AND ORDERED MY MEN TO ENCOURAGE THE FARMERS TO RAISE MORE CROPS FOR NOW, THE JAPANESE WERE ORDERING, CONFISCATING AND GATHERING SUPPLIES WHICH BECAME A HEAVY BURDEN TO OUR CIVILIANS. BY THE LAST WEEK OF NOVEMBER 1942, I MET FELICULO R. SANCHEZ AND HE INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS RECRUITING MEN TO FORM A COMPANY UNDER HIS COMMAND, AND UPON MY CONTACT WITH HIM, HE AGREED TO JOIN MY OUTFIT WHILE IN THE SAME INSTANT, MY ASSISTANT HEAD LEADER MET CAPTAIN TOMAS CENA, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE MALABRIGO JURISDICTION, AND UPON THEIR MUTUAL FRIENDSHIP, THE SAID CAPTAIN CENA AGREED ALSO TO JOIN THE UNIT, UNDER MY COMMAND, THUS FORMING A BATTALION OF THREE COMPANIES, “A” AND “B” AND “C.” BY THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 1942, MY UNIT WAS IN FULL STRENGTH UNDER MY BENEVOLENT ADVICE. FROM THE FOUNDATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS UNIT, I CONCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES AND REGULATIONS OF THE U.S. ARMY, THUS MAKING THE UNIT USAFFE GUERRILLA LOBO UNIT, DERIVED FROM THE MANY USAFFE MEN THAT JOINED THE UNIT AS LEADER AND GUIDE AND INSTRUCTOR. BY THE MONTH OF DECEMBER, I MET LT. TOMAS A. ILAGAN, A RESERVE OFFICER OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT AND AT THE SAME TIME A GUERRILLA LIEUTENANT UNDER CAPTAIN ESTEBAN BELENCIO, 6TH M. D. WHOSE MISSION WAS TO ORGANIZE A UNIT OF BRAVE GUERRILLEROS IN HIS HOMETOWN LOBO, AND BECAUSE HE WAS AN ABLE AND AMBITIOUS LEADER, HE THEN WAS CHOSEN OUR BATTALION COMMANDER AND I AS HIS EXECUTIVE OFFICER.
I AND LT. TOMAS A. ILAGAN APPOINTED BENJAMIN A. ILAGAN TO BE FIRST LIEUTENANT AND DESIGNATED AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND LATER ON ASSIGNED A BATTALION S-3, AFTER THE ATTACHMENT OF THE LUBANG COMPANY WHICH WAS ORGANIZED BY LT. COL. TOMAS A. ILAGAN DURING HIS STAY IN THAT ISLAND.
AS THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE, I ASSIGNED LT. SEVERO A. ILAGAN TO BE THE CAPTAIN OF THE “D” COMPANY WHICH WAS ORGANIZED BY THE SAID LT. COL. I ORDERED MY OFFICERS TO REPORT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ASSIGNMENTS ESPECIALLY IN TRAINING MEN, THAT COVERED SIX MONTHS JUNGLE PRACTICE. I ORDERED MY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVE OFFICERS TO BE ON THE ALERT IN SENDING REPORTS PERTAINING TO THE JAP MOVEMENTS IN OUR SECTOR TO PROTECT THE CIVILIANS FROM SURPRISE ASSAULT OF THE JAPS AND TO BE AWARE OF JAP CAPTURE FOR THE JAPS WERE AWARE OF THE ESPINA FACTION.
BY THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY 1943, MY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVE CAPTAIN BENJAMIN A. ILAGAN SENT COMMUNICATION THAT OUR BATTALION COMMANDER WAS IN CONTACT WITH COL. MANUEL T. DIKIT, A FORMER FIL-AMERICAN IRREGULAR TROOPS [MEMBER] UNDER COL. HUGH STRAUGHN TROOPS (ASN) 02515.
BY THE LAST WEEK OF FEBRUARY 1943, MY SUPERIOR OFFICER WAS SUSPECTED BY [THE] JAPS AND HE WAS CAPTURED AND WAS BROUGHT TO MUNTINGLUPA. I ORDERED MY MEN TO CONTINUE THE UNDER[GROUND] RESISTANCE. MY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES WERE ALWAYS SENDING NEWS TO OUR HEADQUARTERS PERTAINING TO THE JAP MOVEMENTS IN THE BOUNDARY OF LOBO.
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NOW, WE WERE BEING HUNTED BY THE JAPANESE. IN MAY 1943, COL. BARRION (BARILEA) OF THE BARRION’S DIVISION ARRIVED IN OUR SECTOR, A FORMER (GS) GENERAL SERVICE TROOPS, EASTERN LUZON GUERRILLA AREA (ECLGA), AND WE HAD A VERBAL CONFERENCE PERTAINING TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR UNIT. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH MAJOR RAMON RUFFY OF THE MINDORO GUERRILLAS, AND ASIDE FROM THAT, HE ALSO ADVISED TO ADD MORE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES FOR THEY WERE THE EYES AND EARS OF THE ORGANIZATION. SO, IN EVERY PART OF BATANGAS PROVINCE AND MINDORO, I DETAILED CAPABLE MEN AS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES THAT EVERYDAY RUNNERS FROM DIFFERENT SECTORS REPORTED TO OUR HEADQUARTERS WITH THE NEWS REGARDING THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNIT AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMIES.
IN JUNE 1943, I RECEIVED A COMMUNICATION FROM ONE OF MY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES THAT OUR HEADQUARTERS IN MALABRIGO WAS KNOWN TO THE CHIEF OF COMBAT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THE SIXTH MILITARY DISTRICT UNDER GEN. M. PERALTA JR. THIS UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE RESISTED HARMONIOUSLY, MY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES WERE ALL ALERT ON THE JAP SPY MOVEMENT. ALL MY COMPANY COMMANDERS WERE BUSY TRAINING THEIR MEN ON COMBAT PRACTICE SO THAT WHEN THE LIBERATORS LANDED, WE COULD PARTICIPATE [IN] THE MOPPING [UP] OPERATIONS EASILY FOR WE KNEW THE POSSIBLE TRENCH, AND THE STRENGTH OF THE JAPS IN THE CAMP. BY THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1944, I RECEIVED A NOTE THAT MY BATTALION COMMANDER WAS IN CONTACT WITH COL. DANNY P. FLORES AND THAT OUR BATTALION WAS ATTACHED TO THE PANDITA AREA UNDER THE COMMAND OF COL. DANNY P. FLORES, BUT WE RECEIVED NO ATTACHMENT PAPERS.
ON FEBRUARY 7, 1944, I RECEIVED AN ATTACHMENT PAPER FROM ONE OF MY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVE OFFICERS DATED 5 FEBRUARY 1944, FROM THE REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS. BY THE NEXT DAY, I ASSEMBLED MY OFFICERS AND EXPLAINED TO THEM THE ATTACHMENT OF OUR UNIT TO THE PANDITA AREA BEING NOW THE SECOND BATTALION OF THE REGIMENT. AGAIN AND AGAIN, WE HAD BEEN HUNTED BY THE JAPS WHO WERE NOW VERY FIERCE FOR THE BATTLEFRONT WAS NEAR THE PHILIPPINES. THE MORE THE JAPS BECAME WORSE IN THEIR TREATMENT THAT WHENEVER YOU WERE SUSPECTED, YOU WOULD BE ARRESTED AND DIE FROM HEAVY PUNISHMENT.
IN APRIL 1944, OUR BATTALION COMMANDER WAS ORDERED BY COL. DANNY P. FLORES TO PROCEED TO PANAY TO CONTACT THE PANAY GUERRILLAS, BUT UNFORTUNATELY, HE WAS SEIZED BY [THE] JAPS AND WAS [SENT TO] FORT SANTIAGO WITH HIS SEVERAL COMPANIONS.
I ORDERED MY MEN TO BE PROMPT IN SENDING ALARMS IN TIME FOR THE JAPANESE PATROLS [WHO] SOMETIMES HARASSED OR MASSACRED THE CIVILIANS. DURING THIS PERIOD, I HAD BEEN ALWAYS IN CONTACT WITH THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER, RECEIVING ORDERS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS GATHERED BY MEN, BUT INSTANTLY I RECEIVED A NOTE FROM ONE OF MY RUNNERS THAT TWO OF MY OUTPOST WERE CAPTURED. I ORDERED MY MEN TO SHOOT THE JAP PATROL ALONG THE COAST. BY THE SAME WEEK, MY COMBAT PLATOON MADE A COUNTERATTACK AND KILLED SIX JAPS, CONFISCATED A MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH THEIR OWN LETTERING, SIX RIFLES, AND TWO SPY-GLASSES AND THEIR UTENSILS. IN THIS COUNTERATTACK, FOUR OF MY MEN WERE SEVERELY WOUNDED.
DUE TO THE SCARCITY OF CLOTHING, MEDICINE AND FOOD SUPPLIES, MOST OF MY MEN WERE ATTACKED BY DIFFERENT DISEASES SUCH AS MALARIA, DYSENTERY, AND TYPHOID FEVER. THINKING OF THE BEST REMEDIES, I APPOINTED SEVERAL AIDERS TO HELP AND PRODUCE MEDICINE FOR THE ILL. DUE TO THEIR COOPERATIVE RESOURCEFULNESS, THEY WERE ABLE TO PRODUCE THE NECESSARY MEDICINES WHICH, WHEN APPLIED TO THE ILL, MADE TO RESUME THEIR FORMER HEALTH.
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FRIENDLY PLANES BEGAN TO DOMINATE THE AIR, PURSUING ENEMY PLANES, DROP LEAFLETS, AFTER THE LEYTE LANDING, A SYMBOL OF LIBERATION FOR THE PHILIPPINES. I ORDERED MY MEN TO INSTRUCT THE CIVILIANS THE CONTENTS, ENCOURAGE THE POOR FARMERS NOT TO LOSE THEIR FAITH FOR LIBERATION WAS NOW AT HAND, AND OBLIGE THE CIVILIANS WHOSE HOMES WERE NEAR THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND JAPANESE GARRISONS TO EVACUATE TO A SAFER PLACE. I INSTRUCTED MY MEN TO BE ON THE ALERT FOR THE ZERO HOUR OR ANY COMING OCCURRENCES. UPON MY ORDERS, THE COMPANY COMMANDERS DETAILED GUARDS ALONG THE COAST TO GIVE THE ALARM ON TIME OF ANY LANDING OPERATION.
I RECEIVED REPORTS FROM EVERY COMPANY OFFICER IN MY HEADQUARTERS OF THE ACTIVITIES ALONG THE COASTS DURING THOSE PERIODS TO IDENTIFY THE JAPANESE VESSEL HIDING ALONG THE COAST WERE AFTER A LAP OR TWO OR THREE DAYS, OUR FRIENDLY PLANES COULD BE SEEN DIVING FROM THE STRATOSPHERE WITH PERFECT AIMING TO FINISH THEIR MISSION OF DESTROYING JAPANESE CRAFT. BY THE MIDST OF DECEMBER 1944, THE AMERICANS LANDED IN SAN JOSE, MINDORO. HERE IN BATANGAS, THE JAPANESE BECAME VERY ACTIVE TRYING TO MASSACRE THE INHABITANTS.
THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS [OF] CIVILIANS EVACUATED TO THE MOUNTAINS OF LOBO. WE PROTECTED THEM BY ORDERING MY MEN TO GUIDE THEM TO A SAFER DESTINATION. NOW, THE CIVILIANS BECAME AWARE OF THE JAPANESE ACTIONS, SO THEY PREPARED TO EVACUATE TO THE LIBERATED ISLAND OF MINDORO FOR SAFETY. I ORDERED MY MEN TO GUIDE THOSE EVACUEES TO MALABRIGO AS THE SAFEST AND NEAREST START FOR MINDORO. DURING THIS TIME, THE JAPANESE WERE PATROLLING ALONG THE COAST TRYING TO CATCH THE EVACUEES, FOR THEY FEARED THAT WHENEVER THOSE EVACUEES REACHED MINDORO, THEIR POSITIONS WOULD BE REVEALED TO THE AMERICANS.
BY THE LAST WEEK OF 1944, DECEMBER, ONE OF MY COMPANY COMMANDERS AND HIS MEN MADE A COUNTERATTACK ON THE JAPANESE WHILE ESCORTING THE EVACUEES TO THE POINT OF MALABRIGO. ELEVEN JAPS WERE KILLED AND [THE] OTHERS FLED TO THE MOUNTAIN WHILE TWO OF OUR MEN WERE KILLED AND THREE WOUNDED. I ORDERED MY MEN TO MAKE HIDEOUTS NEAR THE TRAIL WHERE THE JAPS WERE PASSING TO BE SAFE FROM SUCH CASUALTIES.
NOW, THE JAPANESE BECAME VERY FIERCE THAT ALMOST DAY AND NIGHT, THEY WERE HUNTING THOSE EVACUEES TRYING TO CUT OFF THOSE MOVEMENTS TO MINDORO. I ORDERED MY MEN TO FIGHT THIS MEASURE OF THE JAPANESE, BY GIVING ADVANCE ALARM TO THE EVACUEES OF THE COMING PATROLS, BY GUIDING THEM TO THE SAFEST TRAILS TO THEIR START BY PROTECTING THEM FROM BEING MASSACRED BY THE JAPANESE BY GUIDING THE TRAIL. ONCE, THE JAPANESE PATROL BOAT TRYING TO CATCH OR TO FIRE AT ANY BOAT AT RANGE, WHEN MY BATTALION’S S-2 SENT THE ALARM ON TIME WHICH SAVED THE EVACUEES BY ORDERING THEM TO DEPART AT ONCE, AND THREE SAIL BOATS ABOUT TO ANCHOR AT MALABRIGO TO GET PASSENGERS WERE SIGNALED NOT TO APPROACH. JUST THEN, THE BOATS WERE THE JAPS WERE RIDING ARRIVED WHEN THE COAST WAS CLEAR. I HAD BEEN ORDERING MY MEN TO BE READY FOR COMBAT ACTION WHEN THE TIME TO STRIKE, TILL THE END OF FEBRUARY WHEN THE AMERICANS WERE IN BATANGAS TOWN, BUT STILL IN VAIN FOR THEY DID NOT LAND IN LOBO. BUT ON MARCH 7, 1945, I RECEIVED [A] REPORT FROM MY BATTALION S-2 THAT TWO P.T. BOATS BEGAN SHELLING A WRONG TARGET, AND AFTER THEY DEPARTED, THAT VERY DAY THE JAPS MOVED TO THE MOUNTAINS.
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I ORDERED MY MEN TO POST GUARDS AND ASSIGN SCOUTS TO GET INFORMATION OF THE JAPANESE PURPOSE MOVEMENTS TILL ON APRIL 5, 1945, I RECEIVED A REPORT THAT TWO BARGES WERE ABOUT TO LAND IN OUR SECTOR. AFTER THEIR LANDING, I APPROACHED THEIR COMMANDING OFFICER TO REVEAL TO HIM THE POSSIBLE POSITION OF THE JAPS IN MT. CALO, SIX KILOMETERS NORTH OF LOBO. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE GUERRILLAS STATIONED IN THE SECTOR WHERE THEY LANDED, BUT AFTER A LAPSE OF TWO HOURS, THEY ASSEMBLED AND RETURNED TO THEIR BARGES, GIVING US WORDS OF THEIR RETURN AND THEY DEPARTED. AFTER TWO DAYS, THE JAPANESE, PROBABLY ALARMED BY THE LANDING IN OUR SECTOR, BEGAN SCOUTING AND RECONNOITERING THE SHORE WHEN ONE OF OUR MEN SIGNALED, AND GAVE THE ALARM OF THE APPROACH. I ORDERED MY MEN TO SEARCH THE GROVES WHERE THE JAPANESE SNIPER OUGHT TO BE AND WAS SHOT ON SIGHT WHEN HE WAS ABOUT TO EXCHANGE FIRE. I ORDERED MY MEN TO PATROL OUR SECTOR AND THIS PATROL ENCOUNTERED A JAP PATROL IN THE BARRIO OF FABRICA, AND HAD KILLED ONE WITHOUT CASUALTY ON OUR SIDE. OUR PATROL REACHED MT. PATONG AND KILLED THIRTEEN JAPS, CONFISCATING TO RIFLES AND TWO SABERS WHICH WERE GIVEN TO LT. GABRIEL GOMEZ, A PHILIPPINE ARMY OFFICER. BY THE MONTH OF JUNE 1945, MY MEN HELPED THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER IN THE MOPPING [UP] OPERATIONS OF THE JAPS ON MT. MALABNIG AND KILLED SEVENTEEN JAPS.
OUR REGIMENTAL COMMANDER DEPARTED FOR BAUAN, BUT BEFORE HE LEFT, HE TOLD US THAT IF ANY AMERICAN FORCES LANDED, WE MUST COOPERATE ESPECIALLY IN MOPPING [UP] OPERATIONS. BY THE MIDDLE OF JUNE 1945, 2ND LT. RALPH ERMATINGER, C.O. FOX CO., LANDED WITH LT. ISLAND. I ORDERED MY MEN TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE AMERICANS IN MOPPING THE JAPS ON MT. MALABNIG. WAR MATERIALS, FOOD AND WATER AND EVERY NECESSARY EQUIPMENT WERE TAKEN TO THE MOUNTAIN BY MY MEN, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO DIDN’T HAVE ARMS.
LIEUTENANT ISLAND WAS KILLED IN ACTION THAT DAY, AND MY MEN CARRIED THE DECEASED TO THE BARGE AND WAS BROUGHT TO BATANGAS. THE JAPS FLED TO THE MOUNTAINS AND TO ANOTHER SECTOR ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS OF MY OFFICERS. STILL, I ORDERED THEM TO PATROL TO SAFEGUARD THE CIVILIANS. BY THE LAST WEEK OF JUNE 1945, MY PATROL IN MT. MALABNIG AND IN THE NEARBY BARRIOS OF THE SAID MOUNTAINS TRAPPED SEVENTEEN JAPS EATING AND WERE KILLED BY HAND GRENADE, ALL THE HEADS OF THE JAPS WERE PRESENTED TO OUR HEADQUARTERS.
LT. ERMATINGER KNOWS THAT THERE WERE STILL ASTRAY JAPS, SO HE TOLD US TO CONTINUE MOPPING [UP] SO AS TO CLEAR OUT ALL THE JAPS. I WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER RECEIVING ORDERS AND SENDING REPORTS. ON 27 JUNE 1945, WHILE CAPTAIN SEVERO ILAGAN AND HIS MEN WERE ON PATROL, THEY ENCOUNTERED ASTRAY JAPS IN MT. PATONG. SIXTEEN JAPS [WERE] KILLED AND [THE] OTHERS FLED TO THE MT. AND ONE OF MY MEN WAS KILLED AND THE OTHER WOUNDED. I ORDERED CAPTAIN CIRIACO SOLIS TO PATROL IN MT. CALO THE NEXT DAY THAT KILLED THREE JAPS WITHOUT CASUALTIES ON OUR SIDE. ON JUNE 29, 1945, I SENT A COMPANY HEADED BY CAPTAIN FELICULO SANCHEZ TO THE BARRIO OF MAPALAD NA PARANG, ENCOUNTERED JAPS, CONTINUOUS FIRING OCCURRED, KILLING NINETEEN JAPS WITH TWO WOUNDED IN SANCHEZ’S SIDE. JUNE 30TH 1945, I ORDERED LT. G.C. RAMIREZ WITH THIRTY-SIX MEN TO MANILA, ENCOUNTERED JAPS, CONTINUOUS FIRING OCCURRED, TWELVE JAPS KILLED WITHOUT CASUALTIES ON OUR SIDE.
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ON THE MONTH OF JULY FIRST, 1945, I ORDERED MY OFFICERS TO ASSEMBLE THEIR MEN FOR INSTRUCTION RECEIVED FROM THE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS. BY THE SAME WEEK, I ORDERED CAPTAIN FELICULO R. SANCHEZ TO POST GUARDS IN THE BARRIOS OF TAYUMAN AND NAGTALONGTONG TO CHECK ON ALL ASTRAY JAPS FOR THE SAFETY OF THE CIVILIANS IN THE BOUNDARY OF LOBO WERE MY MEN IN PATROL FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE REMAINING JAPS.
ON THE FIRST OF AUGUST 1945, I SENT ONE OF MY COMPANIES UNDER THE COMMAND OF CAPTAIN CIRIACO L. SOLIS AND LT. GONZALO C. RAMIREZ TO HELP THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS UNDER THE COMMAND OF LT. FITZGERALD, 5TH COMPANY, FIRST BATTALION, 188TH GLIDER REGIMENT IN RAIDING THE JAP POSITIONS ON MT. CALO. SOME ACTED AS GUIDES, AND BECAUSE WE LACKED ARMS, WE BORROWED RIFLES FROM THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND WE WERE GIVEN SUPPLIES OF AMMUNITION. OUR REGIMENT WAS ATTACHED TO BATTERY “D,” 382ND INF. AAA AW BN. APO-468.
ON AUGUST 2ND 1945, I ORDERED CAPTAIN CENA TO PATROL THE BOUNDARY OF MALABRIGO, ENCOUNTERED JAPS SLAUGHTERING JAPS THIRTEEN JAPS KILLED WITHOUT CASUALTIES ON OUR SIDE, CONFISCATING THREE SABERS AND FOUR RIFLES, WHILE THE OTHER JAPS FLED TO THE MOUNTAIN. BY THE SAME DAY, THE CIVILIANS IN THAT BARRIO TRAPPED THREE JAPS DIGGING CAMOTES AND WERE KILLED INSTANTLY BY SOME OF MY MEN.
ON AUGUST 8, 1945, I ORDERED ONE OF MY OFFICERS, GONZALO C. RAMIREZ, AT LT’S OF THE SAME BATTALION, TO PATROL MT. CALO. WHILE PATROLLING, ONE OF MY MEN WAS KILLED IN ACTION (ISIDRO PLATA). THE PATROL MADE A COUNTERATTACK THAT KILLED FOUR JAPS AND THE EARS WERE TAKEN TO THE HEADQUARTERS AS EVIDENCE.
BY THE SECOND WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 1945, MY PATROL IN THE BARRIO OF BIGNAY ENCOUNTERED ONE ASTRAY JAP AND WAS SHOT ON SIGHT. I ORDERED MY MEN TO CONTINUE PATROLLING IN THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTORS DESIGNATED SO AS TO CLEAR OUT ALL JAP STRAGGLERS. I ALSO ORDERED MY MEN TO COOPERATE WITH THE SPECIAL POLICE SO AS TO SUSPEND BANDITRY.
ON OCTOBER 2, 1945, WE WENT TO MALAPAD NA PARANG AS [A] PATROL BECAUSE OF THE REPORT THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL ASTRAY JAPS. UPON ARRIVING, THERE WERE NONE. IT SO HAPPENED THAT THE NEWS CAME REVEALING THAT MERCADO’S UNIT UNDER THE COMMAND OF LT. COL. F. R. DE LA PEÑA WAS IN [AN] ENCOUNTER WITH THE JAPS IN BILOGO SO WE PROCEEDED TO COOPERATE IN THE OPERATION BECAUSE WE WERE AFFILIATED WITH THAT UNIT AND MAJOR JULIAN MERCADO (LIBERTY) WAS KILLED IN ACTION. AFTER TWO DAYS, WE RETURNED TO THE HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT CASUALTIES ON OUR SIDE.
AS TO MY OBSERVATION, MY ORGANIZATION IS GOING ALRIGHT FOR ALL MY MEN ARE STILL FAITHFUL THROUGH THEY ARE NOT BEING PAID AS OTHER GUERRILLAS, BUT STILL I HOPE THAT MY BATTALION WILL BE PROCESSED AND BE PAID LIKE OTHER UNITS.
(SO HELP ME GOD)
I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR THAT THE FOREGOING FACTS ARE TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION AND BELIEF.
[Sgd.] MAJOR: JACINTO B. MARANAN (INF. GRLA.)
COMMANDING OFFICER: 2ND BN. (LUMA)
LOBO UNIT MINDE-AREA
COMMANDING OFFICER: 2ND BN. (LUMA)
LOBO UNIT MINDE-AREA
Notes and references:
1 “Pandita Area, Free Luzon Intelligence Echelon, 6th MD, [Folder 4],” online at the United States National Archives.