Action Report of USS Shaw (DD373) on the Nasugbu Landing, Jan 1945
DD373/A16 Serial: 072 | c/o Fleet Post Office; San Francisco, Calif.; 3 February 1945. |
From: To: Via: Subject: Reference: | The Commanding Officer. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. (1) The Commander Destroyer Squadron FIVE (CTU 78.2.8). (2) The Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT (CTG 78.2). (3) The Commander Seventh Amphibious Force (CTF 78). (4) The Commander Seventh Fleet (CTF 77). Action Report, Assault Landing, Nasugbu Area, Luzon, 27 January - 2 February, 1945. (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45. (b) ComTaskGroup 78.2 OpPlan 1-45. |
PART I
BRIEF SUMMARY
PART II
PRELIMINARIES
1. Task Group 78.2 consisted of 1 CGC3, 4 APD’s4, 63 LCI’s5, 6 LST’s6, 5 DD’s, 2 PC’s7, 3 DE’s8, and 6 YSM’s9. The SHAW operated in Task Unit 78.2.8, under the command of ComDesRon [Commander Destroyer Squadron] 5, as a member of the screen.
2. A rehearsal of the landing was made on the morning of 27 January 1945, in the vicinity of TARRAGONA, Leyte, P.I., in accordance with annex “K” to reference (b). Sortie was made from the Leyte area at 1800, 27 January 1945, and the task group proceeded without incident to the vicinity of Nasugbu, Luzon, arriving on the morning of 31 January 1945. The troops were landed as scheduled, with reportedly little opposition, and were supported by other vessels of the task group while the SHAW patrolled west and north of Fortune Island carrying out her duties as fighter directing ship. At 0200, 2 February 1945, all ships remaining in the area got underway and proceeded to MANGARIN BAY, Mindoro, P.I., without incident, arriving at 1700, 2 February 1945.
DD373/A16 Serial: 072 | c/o Fleet Post Office; San Francisco, Calif.; 3 February 1945. |
PART III
CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT
January 27, 1945 – “X” minus 4 day
0600 | Underway proceeding independently from SAN PEDRO BAY, TARRAGONA AREA, LEYTE, P.I., in accordance with orders of ComDesRon 5. |
0740 | Took screening station in task group 78.2, for rehearsal of the approach and landing. |
0830 | Conducted practice landing. |
1102 | Anchored off TARRAGONA, Leyte, P.I. |
1655 | Underway in accordance with Appendix 1 to Annex B to reference (b). |
1800 | Formed cruising disposition 1A, SHAW in station 6.2205. Task Group proceeding to objective area. |
January 28, 1945 – “X” minus 3 day
No comments.
January 29, 1945 – “X” minus 2 day
No comments.
January 30, 1945 – “X” minus 1 day
0800 | Mindoro LCI Unit and LST's were detached and proceeded to report to the SOPA10, Mindoro. |
0800 | U.S.S. RUSSELL (DD 414) and minesweeping unit left formation, and proceeded to objective area for minesweeping operations. |
0618 | Signal deploy executed. SHAW proceeded to a patrol station north and west of Fortune Island, in order to reduce, insofar as possible, the land effect on the search radar. |
DD373/A16 Serial: 072 |
c/o Fleet Post Office; San Francisco, Calif.; 3 February 1945. |
0711 | Bombardment of beach commenced. |
0828 | Heard report on voice circuit that the first two waves had landed on the beach with apparently no opposition. |
1400 | Task units 78.2.3, 78.2.4, and 78.2.2 departed from the area enroute Mindoro. |
1945 | Changed patrol to an area approximately 5 miles west of Fortune Island. |
2301 | Received reports over voice circuits that small boats, believed to be “Q11” boats, were attacking our ships near the landing beach. Noticed small caliber fire. |
0752 | U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD 465) sunk a small boat south of Fortune Island. |
1039 | Observed B-24’s bombing Corregidor Island. |
2330 | U.S.S. CONYNGHAM (DD 371) and U.S.S. LOUGH (DD 586) engaged and sank two PT12 boats. Closed transport area to furnish additional support. |
0035 | Resumed patrol west of Fortune Island. |
0250 | Proceeded to take screening station 4.5130 in the task group. The group formed and proceeded to Mindoro, P.I. |
1700 | Task group arrived at Mindoro, P.I. |
PART IV
ORDNANCE
PART V
DAMAGE
DD373/A16 Serial: 072 |
c/o Fleet Post Office; San Francisco, Calif.; 3 February 1945. |
1. SHAW was employed as the fighter director ship for Task Group 78.2 during the entire operation. No fire support missions were assigned to the SHAW in order that her communication equipment would not be disturbed.
Many contacts, both surface and air, were made. However, none of these proved to be of enemy origin.
2. The OpPlan called for a fighter cover of eight VF at all times during daylight hours, and a dawn and dusk patrol of two P-61’s. The following is a resume of the air cover received:
27 January. No cover supplied but none necessary since the task group was in the TARRAGONA area.
28 January. First C.P. on station at 0700, off at 0750. The formation was without cover of any type during the following hours:
1145 – 1445
1505 – 1700
1805 – Dark
29 January. Cover from 0700 – 1832. Four VF maximum at any time.
30 January. Cover from 0655 – 1825. Four VF maximum at any time.
31 January. (“X-ray” day) Cover from 0730 – 1915. Eight to twelve VF at all times until 1800 – 1915 when three VF constituted CAP13. Number of VF on station as CAP varied due to requirements of SAC14.
1 February. Cover from 0730 – 0915. Varied from two to four VF.
2 February. Cover from 0730 – 1845. Varied from two to three VF.
No dawn or dusk cover was received at any time during this operation.
DD373/A16 Serial: 072 | c/o Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, Calif.; 3 February 1945. |
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: Action Report, Assault Landing, Nasugbu Area, Luzon, 27 January – 2 February, 1945.
PART VII
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
PART VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The following comments concerning fighter direction are submitted:
(a) Flights should be more thoroughly briefed as to convoy course, speed and position. This is particularly important to avoid confusion when several convoys are in the same area.
(b) All flights should carry the Shackle Code with them, also copies of the flight or grid.
(c) Flights should be more thoroughly briefed on the operation. Many pilots did not seem to know whether control station was afloat or ashore.
(d) Calls signs or bases should be chosen with care as a great deal of confusion has resulted from similar sounding calls such as “Turret” and “Carrot,” and “Adelade” and “Adelade One.”
(e) A voice code should be developed, or the fighter director code expanded, to enable the fighter director ship to pass information on the CAP to other ships of the formation without endangering security or exposing the Shackle Code to possible compromise.
CinCPac (airmail) – 3
ComDesPac (airmail) – 1
2 “USS SHAW - Report of operations in the assault landing at Nasugbu, Luzon Island, Philippines, 1/31/45-2/2/45,” online at the United States National Archives.
3 CGC stands for Coast Guard Cutter. “Glossary of U.S. Naval Abbreviations – C,” online at Ibiblio.org.
4 APD stands for High Speed Transport Destroyer. “Glossary of U.S. Naval Abbreviations – A,” online at Ibiblio.org.
5 LCI stands for “Landing Craft Infantry,” Wikipedia.
6 LST stands for “Landing Ship, Tank,” Wikipedia.
7 PC stands for Patrol Vessel, Submarine Chaser. “Glossary of U.S. Naval Abbreviations – P,” online at Ibiblio.org.
8 DE stands for Destroyer Escort. “Glossary – D,” op cit.
9 YSM stands for District Motor Mine Sweeper. “Glossary of U.S. Naval Abbreviations, Y,” online at Ibiblio.org.
10 SOPA means Senior Officer Present Afloat. “Glossary of U.S. Naval Abbreviations – S,” online at Ibiblio.org.
11 “Q” boats were “Shin'yō-class suicide motorboat,” Wikipedia.
12 PT stands for Patrol Vessel, Motor Torpedo Boat. Glossary – P, op. cit.
13 CAP stands for Combat Air Patrol. Glossary – C, op. cit.
14 SAC stands for Supreme Allied Command. Glossary – C, op. cit.